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I. INTRODUCTION
As the twenty-first century enters its second decade, India’s population
growth stands to place it as the world’s most populous nation by 2030.1
Most of India’s population lives in rural villages,2 in close proximity to the
nation’s forests rather than major metropolitan centers, like Delhi. With a
land area about one-third the size of the United States3 and a population
almost four times as large,4 Indian forests are under increasing pressure from
population growth as well as economic modernization.5 The forests are
home to some of the world’s signature fauna, including the Bengal tiger and
Asian elephant, as well as a diverse tropical flora unique to the
subcontinent.6 The forests also contain vast reserves of natural resources,
like timber products and minerals.7 With its population growing, demanding
more resources, and consuming more, Indian forests face possible
degradation.8 Any significant degradation would bring greater resource
scarcity that would increase pressure on the government to provide those
resources. Difficulty by the government in provisioning the population
would bring economic and political turmoil within India. Given the
country’s prominence in the world economy and the effect its instability
could cause in world markets, and given the population pressures it faces, the
importance of maintaining forest cover and the attendant resource
1
Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., Population Challenges and Development
Goals, at 5, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/248 (2005).
2
Rural-Urban Distribution, CENSUS OF INDIA, http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Dat
a_2001/India_at_glance/rural.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
3
The World Factbook, U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/pu
blications/the-world-factbook/ (select “India” from the drop down menu of countries and
locations, and then expand the “Geography” tab) (last visited Mar. 31, 2012).
4
Id. (select “References,” then “Guide to Country Comparison”, and then “Population”).
It is estimated that by July 2012, the population of India will be 1,205,073,612, while the U.S.
population will be 313,847,465. Id.
5
See Surya P. Sethi, Principal Adviser, Power & Energy, Gov’t of India, Dialogue on
Cooperative Action, India Presentation to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change COP-12 (Nov. 16, 2006), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/dialogue/applica
tion/vnd.ms-powerpoint/061115_cop12_dial_india.pps.
6
See generally Shalini Bhutani & Ashish Kothari, The Biodiversity Rights of Developing
Nations: A Perspective from India, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2002) (discussing
the megabiodiversity of India).
7
The World Factbook, supra note 3 (select “India” from the drop down menu of countries
and locations, then expand the “Geography” tab, and then expand the “Natural Resources”
tab) (last visited Mar. 31, 2012); National Forest Policy, 1998, pmbl., No. 3-1/86-FP (India),
available at http://moef.nic.in/divisions/fp/nfp.htm.
8
Amiya Kumar Bagchi, From a Fractured Compromise to a Democratic Consensus:
Planning and Political Economy in Post-Colonial India, 26 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 611, 625
(1991) (discussing how densely populated nations face special pressures in environmental
planning).
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availability is critical to ensure India’s economic and political stability. The
future of the forests and Indian stability depends on identifying ways the
Indian government can effectuate maintenance of the nation’s forests.
Unique among common law jurisdictions, India provides constitutional
protections for the environment as well as a wide array of statutory schemes
that address particular environmental concerns.9 Additionally, over the last
thirty years, the Indian Supreme Court has adopted a more activist approach
to its jurisprudence as it relates to social issues.10 The Court’s approach
greatly expanded standing and induced much public interest litigation aimed
at preventing environmental degradation, including deforestation.11 Given
the potential ramifications of forest resource scarcity, it is necessary to
examine the effectiveness of this judicial approach and enforcement of it
through agency action. This examination will aid in determining whether the
current jurisprudence is effective or whether other legal solutions would
provide greater protection to the forests.
Part II of this Note provides a background on the three main Indian legal
mechanisms for environmental protection: the common law, the Indian
Constitution, and statutory schemes. Part II also reviews the Court’s
interpretations of both the Constitution and environmental statutes that
facilitate its authoritative reach.12 In Part III, this Note surveys the
development of the Indian Supreme Court’s activist jurisprudence, beginning
with a discussion of the Court’s expansion of standing and public interest
litigation, both of which not only enable a wider class of plaintiffs to bring
suit to enforce constitutional rights and duties, but also provide a vehicle for
remedying harms to the public interest.13 Part III also outlines how
administrative agencies operate in India, focusing primarily on the Ministry
of Environment and Forests.

9

INDIA CONST. arts. 48A, 51A(g). Article 48A directs the state to protect the environment
and safeguard national forests. Article 51A(g) mandates that Indian citizens protect and
improve the environment, including forests. See, e.g., The Forest (Conservation) Act, No. 69
of 1980, INDIA CODE (1993) [hereinafter The Forest Act] (prohibiting state governments from
using forests for non-forestry purposes without government approval); The Environment
(Protection) Act, No. 29 of 1986, INDIA CODE (1993) (implementing environmental protection
measures discussed at the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972).
10
People’s Faith in Judiciary Led to Judicial Activism, Says Judge, TIMES OF INDIA (Nov. 4,
2011), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-11-04/Kanpur/30358832_1_judicial-acti
vism-session-christ-church-college.
11
J. Mijin Cha, A Critical Examination of the Environmental Jurisprudence of the Courts
of India, 10 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 197, 199–204 (2005).
12
See Delhi Rd. Transp. Corp. v. DTC Mazdoor Cong., A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 101, 193 (India)
(“Public policy can be drawn from the Constitution.”).
13
Id. at 208–09 (discussing the liberalization of standing to increase court access for the
poor and disadvantaged).
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Part IV of this Note examines data on deforestation over the last twenty
years in India and determines whether the rise of the Court’s activism
contributed to increased protection for forests, or whether the Court took
risks without resulting in corresponding benefits to the forests. Finally, Part
V outlines what the Court should do to minimize or reduce deforestation and
also identifies how agencies can take steps toward full implementation of the
protections the Court affords to better protect forests.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION MECHANISMS
There are three basic legal mechanisms for protecting the environment in
India: the Common Law, the Constitution, and more recently, environmental
statutes, particularly the Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980.
A. Indian Common Law
Prior to 1970 and the beginnings of a statutory approach to environmental
protection, Indian common law derived from the British legal system in
place since the colonial era provided several avenues for protecting the
environment.14 Similar to the British and American legal systems, Indian
tort law recognizes nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability as the
central causes of action available for protecting the environment.15 A brief
description of each right of action is necessary to understand the overall
framework of environmental protection in India.
1. Nuisance
The Indian common law divides nuisance into public and private
nuisance.16 The law defines public nuisance, which is both a tort and a
crime, as “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public.”17 A member of the public, however, must show special damages in
order to create a private right of action.18 As a result, environmental
protection litigation based on a public nuisance cause of action rarely
occurs.19

14

KAILASH THAKUR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW AND POLICY IN INDIA 184 (1997)
(discussing how Indian common law continues to provide these causes of action, with
nuisance in particular remaining a popular choice for plaintiffs).
15
Id. at 185–93.
16
Id. at 185.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 186, 190.
19
See id. at 190 (noting that plaintiffs often cannot prove special damages).
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Private nuisance is a tort defined as “the using or authorizing the use of
one’s property or of anything done under one’s control, so as to injuriously
affect an owner . . . of property by physically injuring his property or by
interfering . . . with his health, comfort or convenience.”20 Most often,
private nuisance claims arise as a result of continuing unreasonable use of
land.21 Remedies for private nuisance include both damages and injunctions,
depending on the factual circumstances.22
The tort of nuisance has drawbacks in terms of environmental
protection.23 A nuisance action generally requires the plaintiff to establish
the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct, something notoriously
difficult to prove in Indian courts.24 Moreover, nuisance law application
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in India and therefore consistent
results for plaintiffs are rare.25
2. Trespass
Trespass is a less-used, but still viable, cause of action in Indian
environmental cases.26 Trespass requires “an intentional invasion of the
plaintiff’s interest in the exclusive possession of property.”27 Trespass
closely resembles private nuisance.28 It differs, however, with respect to the
nature of the injury involved.29 With trespass the injury is direct, whereas
with private nuisance it is consequential.30 Though courts readily give relief
for trespass, even displaying an activist sentiment by bending the trespass
definition to accommodate a wide range of pollution sources,31 invocation of
this tort is rare.32

20

Id. at 186.
Id.
22
J.C. Galstaun v. Dunia Lal Seal, (1905) 9 C.W.N. 612 (India) (issuing an injunction
preventing discharge of shellac refuse liquid into a municipal drain and awarding damages for
harm to plaintiff’s health, comfort, and property value of garden).
23
THAKUR, supra note 14, at 189.
24
Id. (noting that this especially true in the case of large corporate defendants whose
actions have high economic and social value).
25
Id.
26
Id. at 190.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. An injury is direct if it results directly from the violation of a legal right. BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 801 (8th ed. 2004). Consequential loss arises from the results of a direct
injury, rather than from the injury itself. Id. at 964.
31
THAKUR, supra note 14, at 190.
32
Id.
21
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3. Negligence
The negligence cause of action in India is identical to that available in the
United States. Negligence requires (1) a legal duty of care; (2) a breach of
that duty by the defendant; (3) a causal connection between the breach and
injury; and (4) the resulting injury.33 Negligence is used infrequently in
environmental actions, often appearing only because of technical difficulties
in nuisance actions.34 Additionally, negligence actions prove difficult in
environmental contexts because of the need to establish a causal connection
between the breach and injury given the inherent challenges in tracing the
sources of pollutants.35
4. Strict Liability: The Rylands v. Fletcher Rule
Though technically still good law, the strict liability rule derived from the
English case Rylands v. Fletcher36 is infrequently applied in environmental
protection actions in India.37
The rule states that “the person
who . . . collects and keeps [on his land] anything likely to do mischief if it
escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its
escape.”38 Because the liability is strict, defendants can raise few defenses.39
The Indian Supreme Court, recognizing the difficulty in applying the
Rylands rule, articulated a harsher strict liability rule in M.C. Mehta v. Union
of India.40 There, the Court introduced an enterprise liability theory for
businesses engaged in inherently dangerous activities.41 The theory creates
absolute liability for any harm resulting from a hazardous activity engaged in
by the enterprise.42 Despite this expansion of strict liability, however, the
cause of action remains relatively unused.43 Unlike public interest litigation,
33

Compare id. at 191, with 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 71 (2010).
THAKUR, supra note 14, at 192.
35
Id. at 193.
36
Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] UKHL 1, 3 (H.L.) 330.
37
THAKUR, supra note 14, at 193.
38
Rylands, 3 (H.L.) at 339–40.
39
Strict liability, unlike simple negligence, eliminates defenses based on causation (which
also eliminates many defenses based on the duty element of negligence because of the close
connection between the two), which are frequent grounds for defending against negligence
claims. Vernon Palmer, A General Theory of the Inner Structure of Strict Liability: Common
Law, Civil Law, and Comparative Law, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1303, 1310 (1988). Certain defenses,
such as denying possession of the thing “likely to do mischief,” and disputing the hazardous
nature of the thing that causes injury, remain.
40
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 819 (India).
41
THAKUR, supra note 14, at 195.
42
Id.
43
Id.
34

758

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 40:751

which can enable relief applicable beyond the parties immediately before the
court, strict liability typically produces limited relief focused only on the
people or property directly injured by the presence of a mischievous or
hazardous item.
B. The Indian Constitution
This section discusses first the basic structure of the Indian Constitution;
second, Article 21 of the Fundamental Rights, a common source of
environmental protection; and third, how the intersection of the Fundamental
Rights and Directive Principles are used by courts to enforce environmental
protections.
1. Basic Structure
Operating much like the American Constitution, the Indian Constitution
contains the fundamental legal precepts of Indian society.44 The document is
split into twenty-two parts. The relevant sections for the purposes of this
Note are Part III, Fundamental Rights; Part IV, Directive Principles of State
Policy (Directive Principles); and Part IVA, Fundamental Duties.
Part III, Fundamental Rights, is similar to the Bill of Rights in the U.S.
Constitution, making inviolable by subsequent legislation basic protections
such as freedom of speech, equal protection, and due process.45 Part IV,
Directive Principles, does not have a ready analogue in American law.46
This part of the Indian Constitution recognizes certain economic, social, and
cultural rights retained by the Indian people.47 These rights, however, are
nonjusticiable by virtue of Article 37 of the Constitution, which prevents
judicial enforcement of the Directive Principles.48 It is the only section of
44
INDIA CONST. preface (“Constitution is a living document, an instrument which makes the
government system work.”). Note also the organizational structure of the Constitution; rights
and duties are labeled as “fundamental,” implying their centrality to Indian society and its
legal system. Id. pt. III.
45
See 1 A.S. CHAUDHRI, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIMITATIONS 168 (1958) (citing W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very purpose of a Bill of
Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy . . . .”)).
46
The U.S. Constitution contains no article that sets forth foundational principles, not
enforceable by judicial review, to guide Congress in its enactment of law. Article I of the U.S.
Constitution enumerates congressional powers but does not animate those powers with policy
directives as the Directive Principles do for Indian constitutional provisions. U.S. CONST. art. I.
47
INDIA CONST. arts. 41–43; see also Vrinda Narain, Water as a Fundamental Right: A
Perspective from India, 34 VT. L. REV. 917, 920 (2010) (“[T]he Constitution recognizes
economic, social, and cultural rights under the Directive Principles of State Policy.”).
48
INDIA CONST. art. 37 (“The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by
any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance
of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.”);
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the Constitution “the violation of which by a law does not render [the law]
pro tanto void.”49 Part IVA, Fundamental Duties, prescribes social
behaviors incumbent on the Indian people to follow, in the interest of society
as a whole.50 Of particular relevance, Article 51A(g) states that it is the duty
of every Indian citizen “to protect and improve the natural environment
including forests.”51 Like the Directive Principles, the Fundamental Duties
are nonjusticiable, though they do guide the Supreme Court in determining
governmental duties.52
2. Environmental Protection Based on Article 21 of the Fundamental
Rights
Article 32 of the Indian Constitution provides Indian citizens “[t]he right
to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement
[of fundamental rights].”53 The Court uses Article 21 (India’s version of the
American Due Process Clause) to expand substantive rights available for
enforcement through Article 32.54 By interpreting the right to life as it has,
the Court created the market for public interest litigation—its preferred
vehicle for enforcement of constitutional rights.55
Through this broadening of the right to life, the Court articulated, among
others, a right to education56 and an environmental right in the form of the
enjoyment of a pollution-free environment.57 Public interest environmental
litigation roared forward upon recognition of a right to environmental

Narain, supra note 47, at 920.
49
2 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA: A CRITICAL COMMENTARY 1923 (4th
ed. 1993).
50
C.M. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE IN INDIA 14 (1999) (comparing the
Fundamental Duties to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
51
INDIA CONST. art. 51A(g).
52
Avani Mehta Sood, Gender Justice Through Public Interest Litigation: Case Studies
from India, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 833, 851 n.95 (2008).
53
INDIA CONST. art 32.
54
Id. art. 21 (“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law.”); Narain, supra note 47, at 920. It is interesting to note the
Court’s utilization of the right to life, as opposed to Article 21’s liberty provision, in its
expansion of protected rights. Substantive due process in the American Supreme Court takes
the opposite tack, protecting individual liberties through the liberty provision of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS & PROBLEMS 451 (2006).
55
Lavanya Rajamani, The Right to Environmental Protection in India: Many a Slip
Between the Cup and the Lip?, 16 REV. EUROPEAN CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 274, 277 (2007).
56
Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 S.C.R. 658, para. 12 (India) (decided prior to
the introduction of Article 21A in 2002 which guaranteed education for children ages six to
fourteen).
57
Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 420, para. 7 (India).
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protection.58 The resulting cases produced a myriad of orders over the past
thirty years, including the landmark decision in M.C. Mehta v. Union of
India, which required both central and state governments to establish mass
education programs regarding the environment.59
The Supreme Court frames the constitutional environmental right
available in India as a negative right because Article 21 itself is framed as
such.60 It is thus not a stand-alone right;61 rather, it is dependent on other
rights for its enforcement.62 It is with this in mind that this Note turns to the
interaction between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles in
the context of the implied environmental right in Article 21.
3. Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles: Co-Application to Form
an Enforceable Environmental Right
In addition to the right of environmental protection that comes from the
Court’s reading of Article 21, Article 48A, a Directive Principle, mandates that
the “State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to
safeguard the forests and wild life of the country.”63 Reading the trio of
Article 21, Article 48A, and the Preamble to the Indian Constitution together,64
the Court has held that “[i]n deciding a case which may not be covered by
authority[,]
courts
have
before
them . . . the
trinity of
the
Constitution . . . . Lacking precedent, the court can always be guided by [its]
light . . . . Public policy can be drawn from the Constitution.”65
Although Article 37 limits direct enforcement of the Directive
Principles,66 the Supreme Court treats the Fundamental Rights and the
Directive Principles “like two wheels of a chariot, one no less important than
the other.”67 This, however, was not always the case. Over the last three
decades, the Court evolved its jurisprudence, going from a time where the
Fundamental Rights always prevailed over the Directive Principles, to the
58

Rajamani, supra note 55, at 275.
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 382 (India).
60
INDIA CONST. art. 21 (“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law.”); Rajamani, supra note 55, at 278 (defining a
negative right as one that requires government inaction for effectuation, as opposed to a
positive right, which requires action).
61
Rajamani, supra note 55, at 278.
62
Id.
63
INDIA CONST. art. 48A.
64
Id. pmbl. (calling for the Indian government to “secure to all its citizens,” justice, liberty,
fraternity, and equality).
65
Delhi Rd. Transp. Corp. v. DTC Mazdoor Cong., A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 101, 193 (India).
66
INDIA CONST. art. 37 (“The provisions contained in [these Directive Principles] shall not
be enforceable by any court.”).
67
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789, para. 61 (India).
59
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last ten years, which have seen the Directive Principles shape activist
interpretations of the Fundamental Rights.68
Armed with Articles 21 and 48A and a “legal ideology . . . centered on
public duty rather than on individual rights,”69 the Court has decided many
cases in favor of greater environmental protection, including protection of
forests.70 It appears that the Court fully intends to continue broadly
interpreting the Constitution to afford greater judicial protection of the
environment. From a private property perspective, which would prefer
private entities determine uses of land, this strategy may appear fraught with
peril.71
Indian communitarian ideologies, however, see the Court’s
jurisprudence as implementing unique Indian cultural ideals.72
C. Environmental Statutes
1. Early Statutes
Local custom dictated use of forest resources in India prior to the British
rule over India.73 The British subsequently regulated the forests as
“resource[s] to be exploited.”74 Eventually the British adjusted their
approach.75 The Indian Forest Act of 1927 (the 1927 Act) provided for the
preservation of forests and set up a framework for forest management,
including previously private forest lands.76 Within a few decades, however,
it became apparent that the 1927 Act did not successfully protect the interests
of forest inhabitants.77 Not only did the 1927 Act fail to protect the forest,

68

ABRAHAM, supra note 50, at 18; see also Minerva Mills Ltd., A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789
(holding two constitutional amendments passed by Parliament to be in violation of the basic
structure of the Constitution, which structure is informed in part by the Directive Principles).
69
ABRAHAM, supra note 50, at 18.
70
See, e.g., T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 4256
(ordering the closure of saw mills within ten kilometers of protected forest).
71
Lynda L. Butler, Private Land Use, Changing Public Values, and Notions of Relativity,
1992 BYU L. REV. 629, 631 (discussing the reactions of private land owners to environmental
regulations affecting their future interest in their land).
72
ABRAHAM, supra note 50, at 19.
73
S.S. Garbyal, Comments on Forest Legislation, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENT, FOREST
& WILDLIFE PROTECTION LAWS IN INDIA 19 (1998); Timothy J. O’Neill, Through a Glass
Darkly: Western Tort Law from a South and East Asian Perspective, 11 RUTGERS RACE & L.
REV. 1, 7 (2009).
74
Garbyal, supra note 73, at 19.
75
Id.
76
Id.; The Indian Forest Act, No. 16 of 1927, INDIA CODE (1993), available at http://env
for.nic.in/legis/forest/forest4.html.
77
Garbyal, supra note 73, at 19 (noting that the 1927 Act codified extraction of forest
resources rather than addressing sustainability and local populations).
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the 1952 National Forest Policy extended forests beyond their traditional
area and gave impetus to forest farming and agricultural forestry.78
In 1976, the national government, concerned with the rising rate of
deforestation, enacted the forty-second amendment to the Indian
Constitution, which transferred forests from state listing79 only, to concurrent
listing with the government.80 Subsequently, the government formed the
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) and established
“administrative jurisdiction over national forest development.”81 MOEF and
its role in forest protection are explored in greater depth in Part III below.
2. Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980
Four years after the forty-second amendment, the government enacted the
Forest (Conservation) Act of 1980 (the Forest Act).82 This legislation
effectively prohibits state governments from “allowing the use of any forest
lands for non-forestry purposes without the prior approval of the
[government].”83 The Forest Act’s definition of non-forestry purpose
includes “any purpose other than reafforestation; but does not include any
work relating [to] . . . conservation, development and management of
forests.”84
The Forest Act also gives the government the power to create a
committee to advise the government on grants of approval under Section 2 of
the Forest Act, as well as on other matters relating to forest conservation the
government sees fit to refer to the committee.85 Further, violations of the
Forest Act carry criminal penalties, both for individuals who violate the Act
and for negligent government officials.86
In addition to creating an advisory committee, the Forest Act also
empowers the government to promulgate rules for carrying out its
provisions.87 In 1981, the government acted pursuant to Section 4(1) and
78
National Forest Policy, 1952, No. 13-1/52-F (India), available at http://forest.ap.nic.in/fo
rest%20policy-1952.htm.
79
India has a federal system of government, with states and a national government, much
like the United States. A simple read through of the Indian Constitution’s Table of Contents
demonstrates the federal structure of India’s government. INDIA CONST.
80
THAKUR, supra note 14, at 277; The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, No.
91 of 1976, INDIA CODE (1993).
81
THAKUR, supra note 14, at 277 (noting that prior to the formation of MOEF there existed
no agency for the administration of environmental policy).
82
Id.; The Forest Act, supra note 9.
83
Garbyal, supra note 73, at 20.
84
The Forest Act, supra note 9.
85
Id. § 3.
86
THAKUR, supra note 14, at 277; The Forest Act, supra note 9.
87
The Forest Act, supra note 9, § 4.
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created the Forest (Conservation) Rules (the Rules).88 The Rules define the
composition and function of the advisory committee, as well as outline the
considerations the committee must use in “tendering its advice.”89 The Rules
also confirm that the advice of the committee is just that—advice.90 The
government is in no way obligated to do anything more than consider the
advice, having the power to “grant approval to [a] proposal with or without
conditions or reject the same.”91
Contemporary Indian legal scholars harshly criticize the Forest Act and
associated rules.92 Many view the Forest Act as “merely centrali[zing] the
power concerning forest land use,” without “[doing] much for the protection
and conservation of forests.”93 Scholars also complain that though the Forest
Act provides protection for property rights to forest land and products, it
denies access to the forests by indigenous people who live in them.94
In response to the Forest Act’s inability to either protect forests or carry
out reforestation, the government resorted to administrative decrees to
achieve those objectives.95 As well, the Indian Supreme Court effectively
circumvented the Forest Act’s provision allowing application to the
government for de-reservation96 of forests by determining that the word
“forest” as used in the Forest Act encompassed and protected forests
regardless of de-reservation or statutory recognition.97
The virtual
abandonment of statutory procedures by the Court, as well as the
government’s reticence to use the same, indicate that the Forest Act, while
substantively inspirational to Supreme Court orders, is no longer
procedurally central to Indian efforts at containing deforestation.

88

Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests, Forest (Conservation) Rules, 2003, Gazette
of India (Jan. 10, 2003), available at http://envfor.nic.in/legis/forest/gsr23(e).htm.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
THAKUR, supra note 14, at 278.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Reservation is used to refer to the Forest Act’s prohibition on the use of forests, in effect
reserving them, for anything other than forestry purposes.
97
See T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1228, 1230
(India) (holding the provisions of the Forest Act “apply to all forests irrespective of the nature
of ownership or classification thereof”).
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III. ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
A. Judicial Activism in the Indian Supreme Court
The Indian Constitution expressly provides for judicial review, unlike in
the United States where the doctrine developed in the courts.98 The Indian
Supreme Court, however, originally upheld executive and legislative actions,
choosing to interpret the Constitution strictly, in keeping with the British
positivist view of law.99 It was not until 1950, in A.K. Gopalan v. Madras,100
that the Court first asserted its powers of judicial review.101
Thereafter, the Court slowly grew into its role as a court of “good
governance,” actively policing the actions of other branches.102 It was not
until the post-emergency period103 “that the Court’s jurisprudence blossomed
with doctrinal creativity as well as processual innovations.”104
1. Standing
The major doctrinal innovation undertaken by the Court during this time
was to expand standing requirements.105 The traditional approach to
standing, in both American and Indian jurisprudence, has been that “only an
aggrieved person that is [someone] who ha[s] suffered a specific legal injury
[can] bring an action for judicial redress.”106 The Indian Supreme Court
98

INDIA CONST. arts. 13 §§ 1–2, 32 § 2; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)
(establishing the doctrine of judicial review in the United States); S.P. Sathe, Judicial
Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 29, 37–41 (2001).
99
S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA 40–41 (2002).
100
A.K. Gopalan v. Madras, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27 (India).
101
SATHE, supra note 99, at 40. In Gopalan, the Court upheld the government’s position,
deciding not to exercise its power to void a legislative enactment. Gopalan, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27.
102
SATHE, supra note 99, at 43 (using good governance in reference to the Court’s role as
overseer of other governmental branches). The Indian Supreme Court maintained a positivist
approach to judicial review even after Gopalan. Id. For example, in 1975 the Court held by a
4–1 vote that they were powerless to protect individuals from assertions of executive power,
even if the assertion deprived the person of life and/or liberty. A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant
Shukla, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1207 (India). Only in the arena of property rights did the Court
attempt an activist approach, and even there they encountered stiff resistance from Parliament.
SATHE, supra note 99, at 46.
103
The emergency period refers to two years of martial law declared by Indira Ghandi after
the Allahabad State Court convicted her of election fraud. Manoj Mate, The Origins of Due
Process in India: The Role of Borrowing in Personal Liberty and Preventive Detention Cases,
28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 216, 243 (2010). During this time the government restricted many
civil liberties and fundamental rights. Id.
104
SATHE, supra note 99, at 100 (stating that the post-emergency period is generally thought
to run from 1977–1978).
105
Rajamani, supra note 55, at 275.
106
Id.
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rationalized the move away from this definition of standing as done “in the
service of the poor, oppressed and voiceless.”107
The Court’s first step in expanding standing was to recognize
representative standing.108 In Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, the
Court allowed the petitioner to move for redress of wrongs committed
against those who could not approach the Court themselves, either because
of social (caste) or economic disadvantage.109 In the same case, the Court
also recognized epistolary jurisdiction, where letters to the Court are treated
as writ petitions.110
One year later, in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, the Court went even
further, allowing members of the public to claim redress for public injuries
arising out of a breach of public duty.111 The Court recognized the dangers
inherent in opening its doors to what is often referred to as “citizen
standing,”112 yet saw activism as “essential for participative public
justice.”113
2. Public Interest Litigation
This liberalization of standing requirements resulted in a new class of
legal action: public interest litigation (PIL).114 PIL suits seek to redress
wrongs to public interests, such as the right to a clean environment.115 PIL
involves the Court in not only application of law to fact, but also factfinding, administrative agency monitoring, and policy determinations.116
Under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court has far-reaching power to
act in ways that would be unthinkable in an American court.117 The Court
107

Id.
Clark D. Cunningham, Public Interest Litigation in Indian Supreme Court: A Study in the
Light of American Experience, 29 J. INDIAN L. INST. 494, 499 (1987); SHYAM DIVAN & ARMIN
ROSENCRANZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN INDIA: CASES, MATERIALS AND STATUTES
135 (2d ed. 2002).
109
Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Admin., (1980) 2 S.C.R. 557 (India).
110
Rajamani, supra note 55, at 275.
111
Id.; S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149 (India).
112
Rajamani, supra note 55, at 276 (“[I]f we keep the door wide open for any member of the
public to enter the portals of the court to enforce public duty . . . the court will be flooded with
litigation.”).
113
Id.
114
Id. Public Interest litigation can be pursued directly to the Supreme Court if the
complaint, or citizen letter, alleges violation of a Fundamental Right. Id. at n.30.
115
SATHE, supra note 99, at 211 (discussing Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of
India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 344 (India), a case where workers in a public sector company sued
their employer to prevent losses to the public treasury).
116
Rajamani, supra note 55, at 276.
117
INDIA CONST. art. 142 (empowering the Court to “make such order as is necessary for
doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it”).
108
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interprets this provision to encompass not only damages and injunctive relief,
but also a wide range of administrative solutions, like continuing
mandamus.118 This essentially allows the Court to monitor the executive and
legislative branches.119 The Court also put in place bureaucratic committees
to monitor the enforcement of final decrees, which are typically widereaching.120
However, the Court’s orders are enforceable only by the President, both
at his discretion and in ways he finds appropriate, until such time as
Parliament passes enforcement legislation.121 This apparent paradox in the
form of a relatively toothless constitutional enforcement mechanism might
be the root cause of much of the ineffectiveness in the Court’s orders.122
After the Court recognized the right to a pollution-free environment in
1991,123 it incorporated not only many established principles of international
environmental law, but also some nascent ones into its environmental
rulings.124 As international environmental law expert Lavanya Rajamani
notes, “[t]hese [principles] include the polluter pays principle, the
precautionary principle, the principle of inter-generational equity, the
principle of sustainable development and the notion of the state as a trustee
of all natural resources [including forests].”125 Combined with the advent of
PIL, this wide-ranging environmental right led to the Court’s oversight of
virtually every area of environmental governance.126
For instance, in the Delhi Pollution Case,127 the Court on its own motion
mandated that the administration of the state of Delhi use compressed natural

118

According to Rule 9 of the Supreme Court Rules of India, the Court “may, if it thinks fit,
grant such ad interim relief to the petitioner, as the justice of the case may require, upon such
terms, if any as it may consider just and proper.” The Supreme Court Rules, 1966, pt. IV,
order xxxv, para. 9 (India).
119
Rajamani, supra note 55, at 276. Indian law professor Upendra Baxi referred to this as
“creeping jurisdiction.” Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in
the Supreme Court of India, in JUDGES AND THE JUDICIAL POWER 289, 298–300 (R. Dhavan et
al. eds., 1985).
120
Rajamani, supra note 55, at 276.
121
INDIA CONST. art. 142 (“[A]ny . . . order so made shall be enforceable
throughout . . . India in such manner as may be prescribed by . . . any law made by Parliament
and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order
prescribe.” (emphasis added)).
122
See generally SEERVAI, supra note 50; CHAUDHRI, supra note 46 (discussing the Indian
constitution).
123
Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 420 (India).
124
Lavanya Rajamani, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India: Exploring Issues
of Access, Participation, Equity, Effectiveness and Sustainability, 19 J. ENVTL. L. 293, 294
(2007).
125
Id. at 294–95.
126
Id.
127
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1086 (India).
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gas in the city’s bus fleet in order to reduce air pollution.128 The Court
essentially made a legislative policy choice that affected not only local
governmental bodies, but also private citizens and companies.129 It is clear
from the Court’s willingness to extend its authority over something as
policy-specific as fuel choice for a city’s bus fleet that the lines between
judicial and legislative purview blur when it comes to environmental
concerns.130 This blurring continues today, with the Court issuing farreaching orders in PIL as recently as March, 2010.131
B. Indian Administrative Agencies
As in many modern administrative states, agencies and local governments
occupy key roles in the administration of environmental law in India.132 In
India, the government established MOEF subsequent to the passage of the
forty-second amendment.133 This ministry “is the nodal agency in the
administrative structure of the [government] for the planning, promotion, coordination and overseeing [of] the implementation of India’s environmental
and forestry policies and programmes.”134
MOEF is responsible for monitoring Indian forest cover and reporting its
statistical data to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, in addition to other responsibilities.135 MOEF also coordinates and
monitors the National Forest Commission, set up under Article 2 of the
Forest Act.136 This commission advises MOEF as to whether applications to
use forest land for non-forest uses should be approved.137 As noted above in
128

Armin Rosencranz & Michael Jackson, The Delhi Pollution Case: The Supreme Court of
India and the Limits of Judicial Power, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 223, 233 (2003) (citing S.C.
Writ Petition (Civil), M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1998) (No. 13029/1985), available at
http://www.elaw.org/node/2783 (click the link below the word “Attachment”)).
129
Id. at 233–34.
130
SATHE, supra note 99, at 229–30 (discussing how the expanded meaning of justiciability
in PIL creates a more positive role—in the sense of action as opposed to inaction—for the
Court).
131
See Goan Real Estate & Constr. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2010) 5 S.C.C. 388 (India)
(holding construction completed within fifty meters of the coastline pre-1996 to be legal,
despite public interest litigation setting aside the agreement which reduced the permitted
construction zone to fifty meters).
132
1 M.P. JAIN & S.N. JAIN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 663 (6th ed. 2007).
133
THAKUR, supra note 14, at 277.
134
About the Ministry, MINISTRY OF ENV’T & FORESTS, GOV’T OF INDIA, http://moef.nic.in/
modules/about-the-ministry/introduction/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
135
Id.; see infra note 153.
136
Forest Policy Division, MINISTRY OF ENV’T & FORESTS, GOV’T OF INDIA, http://envfor.
nic.in/divisions/forpol.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
137
Id. (identifying that one of the functions of the commission is “mak[ing]
recommendations indicating policy options for achieving sustainable forest and wildlife
management and development, bio-diversity conservation and ecological security”).
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the discussion of the Forest Act, however, both the application process and
the commission have limited power, with the Court approving and denying
applications.138
Furthermore, the Supreme Court is the only court to retain its jurisdiction
over administrative tribunals set up by Parliament or state legislatures
governing matters including environmental concerns.139 In S.P. Sampath
Kumar v. U.O.I,140 the Court exercised this jurisdiction by defining the
process for selection of tribunal members, going so far as to require legal or
judicial experience for tribunal chairmen.141
The Indian administrative system operates similarly to that of the United
States and other common law countries in some respects, while differing in
others.142
The fundamental difference between Indian and U.S.
administrative law is the application of the separation of powers doctrine.143
The U.S. constitutional framework provides for three mutually exclusive
branches of government.144 Though the judicial branch is nominally
separated from the legislative and executive branches in India,145 in reality
the Supreme Court has gathered so much control that it is, in effect, a court
of good governance over the other branches, not just a judicial organ.146
The centralization of power in the Court is not without reason,
however.147 Administrative agencies in India, including MOEF, often do not
enforce their mandates.148 There is little accountability,149 and thus agencies
have little incentive to respond to public grievances.150
138

T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1228 (India).
1 JAIN & JAIN, supra note 132, at 663 (noting that Article 323B of the Indian Constitution
“empowers the appropriate legislature to provide . . . tribunals . . . with respect to the
following matters: (i) taxation . . . [and] (v) land reforms,” which can exclude the jurisdiction
of any court except the Supreme Court).
140
S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 435 (India).
141
1 JAIN & JAIN, supra note 132, at 664.
142
1 id. at 17–19 (noting that all common law systems are subject to the same rule of law
principle, yet are driven by different constitutional law backgrounds).
143
1 id. at 17, 31.
144
See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III (Article I provides for legislative authority to reside with
Congress. Article II consigns all executive authority to the president. Article III establishes
the federal judiciary and the scope of its jurisdiction); 1 JAIN & JAIN, supra note 132, at 32.
145
See INDIA CONST. pts. VI, IXA (laying out structure of the National Government’s
executive, legislative, and judicial branches, as well as defining the role of municipalities in
the Indian system).
146
SATHE, supra note 99, at 43 (noting that the Court was not a mere legal court and had a
political role to play).
147
1 JAIN & JAIN, supra note 132, at 2296 (concluding that judicial activism has been helpful
in the area of environmental protection because of the “apathy and inertia of the
Administration to enforce anti-pollution laws”).
148
Id. at 2309 (discussing how “public interest litigation has grown in India because of
bureaucratic unresponsiveness”).
149
India does not have an ombudsman system—where non-agency officials oversee
139
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In addition to systemic inertia, agencies also face potential shortfalls in
the resources needed to effectively monitor compliance, monitor
afforestation, and seek redress for grievances against the public interest.151
For instance, though spending levels on afforestation and reforestation are
higher now than they were ten years ago, funding dropped in certain years,
with a recent downward trend from the highs of 2007.152 Faced with such
resource constraints and inertia issues, agencies cannot be relied on to deliver
reliable environmental protection.
IV. ACTIVISM AND DEFORESTATION
Before addressing the impact of activism on deforestation, it is important
to have a sense of what India’s forests look like today as compared to years
past. Unlike many countries in southeast Asia, according to official reports
India’s forests have not seen high rates of deforestation over the previous
twenty years.153 In fact, according to the Indian government and United
Nations (whose statistics derive from reports submitted by the Indian
government), Indian forests today cover a slightly higher percentage of the
land area than twenty years ago.154 These appraisals of forest cover,
however, may not paint the most realistic portrait of Indian forests.155
Evidence suggests that removing the growth in commercial exotic tree
plantations from forest growth calculations would show actual deforestation
of native Indian forests.156 Data indicates that, since the 1990s, these
plantations grew at a rate of approximately 18,000 square kilometers per
year.157 If in fact government statistics do not compensate for the growth in
plantations, deforestation rates for native forests and the success of
afforestation may need reexamination.

agencies’ adherence to their mandates—to ensure agency accountability. Id. at 2269.
150
Id. at 2309.
151
See National Afforestation Program: Year-wise Summary, 2000-2010, NAT’L
AFFORESTATION & ECO-DEV. BOARD, http://www.naeb.nic.in/statics.html (under Statistics at a
Glance, and National Afforestation Programme (NAP), click “Funds Released”) (last visited
Oct. 30, 2011) (stating that from 2000–2010 approximately $500 million went toward
afforestation programs in all twenty-nine states).
152
Id.
153
FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., GLOBAL FOREST RESOURCES ASSESSMENT 2010, at 230
(2010), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1757e/i1757e.pdf (noting Indian forest
cover was 63,939 hectares in 1990 and 67,709 hectares in 2004).
154
Id.
155
Jean-Philippe Puyravaud et al., Cryptic Loss of India’s Native Forests, 329 SCIENCE 32,
32 (2010) (discussing how satellite imagery used to determine forest cover does not
distinguish between commercial tree plantations and native forest cover).
156
Id.
157
Id.
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With that picture of the state of forests roughly outlined, it is now proper
to overlay judicial activism and forestation rates to determine if the former
has affected the latter. As discussed above, the Indian Supreme Court’s
environmental reach has expanded greatly since 1980.158 The Court oversees
administrative tribunals and it allows anyone to write a letter and initiate
public interest litigation.159 Access to the Court for judicial redress could not
be broader in terms of standing.160 Court control over the other branches of
government exceeds that of other constitutional common law courts in the
world.161
At the same time, as the Court opened its doors to all comers and
exercised greater control over administrative actions, the forests of India
remained vulnerable, even shrinking according to some statistics.162 On its
face, data suggesting that forest cover shrank over the last twenty years
partially contradict any assertion that the Court’s judicial activism played a
successful role in providing adequate protection to forests. If forest cover in
fact shrank, the relaxation of standing requirements and the increase in
public interest litigation correlate to a slight decrease in forest cover. If
government statistics represent reality, however, these doctrinal changes
correlate to a slight increase in forest cover.163
Such a comparison is incomplete, however. A second question must be
asked before the true effect of the Court’s activist approach on deforestation
can be understood. What would have happened had the Court not expanded
standing and encouraged public interest litigation? Although speculative in

158
See, e.g., S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149 (India) (expanding standing
to include citizen standing in public interest litigation); M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R.
1992 S.C. 382 (India) (involving four hundred industries and one hundred municipalities in
oversight by the Court).
159
1 JAIN & JAIN, supra note 132, at 663 (outlining the retained jurisdiction of the Court
over administrative tribunals); see also Rajamani, supra note 55, at 275 (noting that the Court
recognized epistolary jurisdiction in Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Admin., (1980) 3 S.C.C. 488).
160
Allowing any person, injured or not, to initiate suit, whether they intended to or not, is at
least close to the outer limit of standing. Cf. Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.,
528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000) (outlining the elements of standing in American courts). The
Indian Supreme Court requires that an injury to the public be present, but does not limit who
can seek redress for it. See S.P. Gupta, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 149.
161
The British Supreme Court does not have the power to invalidate laws of Parliament.
Monica A. Fennell, Emergent Identity: A Comparative Analysis of the New Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom and the Supreme Court of the United States, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J.
279, 295 (2008). The American Supreme Court retains the power to invalidate laws of
Congress; however, it also retains strict rules of standing requiring a “concrete and
particularized injury” to sustain a cause of action. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
162
Puyravaud et al., supra note 155, at 32.
163
See supra note 153 (citing government statistics that show greater forest cover in 2004
than 1990).
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nature, this inquiry is necessary to understand the full effects of the Court’s
approach.
Precise forest cover levels, absent expanded standing, are impossible to
discern. The standing expansion is historical fact and cannot be erased from
the record. The effects of traditional standing on judicial enforcement of
rights and the likelihood of Indian agency inaction absent judicial prodding,
however, are known. Agencies simply do not enforce statutes as vigorously
without oversight, whereas when courts hold them accountable there is more
incentive to take action.164 The Court’s expanded standing requirements,
moreover, increase citizen enforcement actions and PIL in the environmental
context and in doing so increase opportunities for oversight of agencies.165
Together, these two known cause-and-effect relationships suggest that, at a
minimum, governmental enforcement (judicial or administrative) of forest
laws would wane absent the Court’s activist stance.
If a lack of expanded standing and public interest litigation decreased
enforcement as expected, it is also likely that forest cover would decline in
tandem. Without judicial oversight and agency enforcement, industries
would not be as accountable for encroaching on indigenous lands in their
search for minerals and forest products. There would be few consequences
to forest destruction other than higher profits, something private entities
pursue with vigor.
Unprotected, the commons (public utility lands for the common benefit of
villagers)166 would face rapid extinction at the hands of those who would
exploit public resources for private benefit. Given the risks to the judicial
system posed by liberal standing requirements and an activist approach to
judicial decision making,167 however, it bears examining whether the Court’s
activism benefits more than it burdens. The fears of expanded standing
include a multiplicity of frivolous lawsuits and the resulting judicial morass,
as well as “the predilections of the judges [ruling] the day.”168 Despite these
reasonable fears, the expansion of standing in India has not resulted in the
Court hearing a plethora of nonjusticiable issues.169 This is at least in part

164

1 JAIN & JAIN, supra note 132.
SATHE, supra note 99, at 224–25 (discussing the wide range of circumstances in which
the Court dealt with environmental protection in the face of government intransigence).
166
See Jagpal Singh v. State of Punjab, Civil Appeal No. 1132/2011 at SLP(c) No.
3109/2011, para. 3 (India).
167
Rajamani, supra note 55, at 276 (noting fear of litigation flood if standing were relaxed).
168
Id. at 285.
169
1 JAIN & JAIN, supra note 132, at 2314 (noting that to avoid ruling in favor of claims that
under previous standing doctrine would have been nonjusticiable, the Court can (1) refuse to
decide a case on the merits; (2) dismiss for failure to state a claim; or (3) reject the claim on
the merits rather than deny relief because of a lack of standing).
165
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because there is no recovery for the named plaintiff in PIL outside of the
protection sought for the public interest in which the plaintiff shares.170
Fears of a judge’s own views dictating outcomes are also often espoused
in opposition to activist jurisprudential approaches.171 In the United States
today, the phrase “judicial activism” is practically an epithet, for the very
reason that it implies a judge making his own law instead of applying the law
as found in precedent.172 There exists a notion that society is ill-served by an
unelected body having the power to hand down law without going through a
legislative process.173
In India, however, judicial activism occurs in a different cultural milieu,
surrounded by different governmental institutions and capabilities. Indian
society does not have the same emphasis on private property or
individualism that is present in U.S. society.174 Communitarianism rather
than individualism is the dominant ideology, and it has only grown in
importance since the end of British rule.175 The Preamble to the Indian
Constitution even states that the document forms a socialist government; a
form more oriented toward community rights than the constitutional system
of the United States.176
Moreover, the Indian Government has a history of corruption in all areas
of governance, not just environmental protection.177 From the time of Indian
170

Ashok H. Desai & S. Muralidhar, Public Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems, in
SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE—ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 159,
165 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000) (“A PIL petitioner is provided by the Court as one who
draws its attention to a grievance requiring remedial measures and having no personal stake in
the matter.”).
171
Viet D. Dinh, Threats to Judicial Independence, Real and Imagined, 95 GEO. L.J. 929,
939 (2007) (listing elements common to many understandings of judicial activism).
172
See, e.g., Alexander Mooney, Specter Issues Parting Blow to Roberts, Alito, CNN, http://p
oliticalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/12/21/specter-issues-parting-blow-to-roberts-alito (last visited
Jan. 6, 2012).
173
Dinh, supra note 171, at 940 (“An activist court ‘legislates from the bench,’ and thus,
‘encroaches on the legislature’s constitutional turf.’ ”).
174
ABRAHAM, supra note 50, at 83 (“[I]ndividualistic notions are made subservient to the
needs of the system as a whole, in effect a situation where public interest overrides private
interest.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
175
Sarah Joseph, Politics of Contemporary Indian Communitarianism, ECON. & POL.
WKLY., Oct. 4, 1997, at 2517.
176
INDIA CONST. pmbl.; Thomas T. Ankersen & Thomas K. Ruppert, Defending the
Polygon: The Emerging Human Right to Communal Property, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 681, 694
(2006) (noting that the protection of civil and political rights, rights at the center of the U.S.
Constitution’s protections, came before socialism, which grew in response to the economic
disparities present at the beginning of the twentieth century).
177
Ashish S. Prasad & Violeta I. Balan, Strategies for U.S. Companies to Mitigate Legal
Risks from Doing Business in India, in DOING BUSINESS IN INDIA: CRITICAL LEGAL ISSUES FOR
U.S. COMPANIES 31 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 11926, 2007)
(discussing the pervasiveness of bribery in both government and private sector engagements).
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nobility pre-British rule, through 1948 when India regained its independence,
to modern times with an elected executive, the persons and bodies in charge
of the country have often exploited the commons to benefit a select few.178
From maharaja, the Indian version of an English king, to the prime minister,
executives in India are not known for judicious handling of the country’s
resources.
As a result of executive misfeasance and nonfeasance, the Indian
Supreme Court began oversight of executives, both state and federal, in a
multiplicity of circumstances, including over MOEF and environmental
decisions (and non-decisions).179 Given the historical exploitation of the
commons and the propensity for executive inaction, the Court’s oversight
role appears more appropriate. Although Americans may blanch at the idea
of the judiciary essentially legislating from its unelected perch, Indian forests
likely benefits from this approach. The commons, including the forests,
receive much greater protection and attention from the Court than they have
under the oversight of any other body.180
Because expanded standing has not resulted in a flood of frivolous
lawsuits, and judicial oversight is likely an appropriate response to executive
inability or unwillingness to protect the commons, judicial activism remains
a viable component of protecting Indian forests.181 Though forest cover may
be less than it was when the Court began its activist approach, there is no
reason to suspect the Court’s jurisprudence had no positive effect on the
deforestation rate. To the contrary, it is far more likely that absent the
Court’s direction, forests in India would cover even less of the nation than
they currently do. Therefore, absent clear negative impacts of its activist
jurisprudence on governmental institutions or society, the Court should
continue its activist approach as a court of good governance.

178

See ANN GRODZINS GOLD & BHOJU RAM GUJAR, IN THE TIME OF TREES AND SORROWS
126 (2002) (describing how the commons once were the private lands of the maharaja);
Prasad & Balan, supra note 177, at 31 (citing a 2000 survey by India’s Central Vigilance
Commission finding that “almost fifty percent of Indians [using] government services pay
bribes”). Modern exploitation often is less a matter of agencies actively working against
communitarian interests and more a matter of agencies and the executive not acting, that is,
failing to enforce their legislative mandates.
179
Rajamani, supra note 55, at 276.
180
Id. at 278. Though beyond the scope of this Note, one might validly ask whether that
protection comes at a cost in terms of economic development.
181
If the Supreme Court ever allows its personal predilections to trump the public interest
when it is deciding cases, its activist tendencies could be used to make policy choices
damaging rather than reparative to the public interest. As outlined above, however, this
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V. MOVING FORWARD
This Part attempts to provide a blueprint for agency and Supreme Court
action to ensure that the government protects India’s forest-based resources.
First, this Part will outline the steps the Court should take to prevent
deforestation. Second, it will propose a plan of action for MOEF and other
relevant agencies that will minimize agency inaction on forest matters and
make better use of the limited resources agencies have at their disposal.
A. The Indian Supreme Court in the Twenty-First Century
As detailed in the previous Part, expansions in activist jurisprudence have
for the most part been implemented. For example, it would be very hard for
the Court to liberalize standing further.182 Furthermore, the Court does not
view its activist approach as particularly controversial, as the justices almost
universally accept the role the Court has today.183 Thus, it is unlikely that
any further acceptance of activism by the Court would increase the scope of
its application.
Given that its activist approach to environmental issues has seen some
success in protecting forests,184 the Court should continue to invite PIL and
maintain standing requirements as they currently exist. To hold accountable
those responsible for deforestation, the Court should continue to recognize
epistolary jurisdiction as a way to increase and equalize access to the judicial
system. Moreover, the Court should continue to respond to such letters by
initiating Court-monitored investigations and commissions. Though outside
the traditional ambit of a constitutional court, the need for this oversight
persists because many Indian political and industrial interests continue to
subvert the public interest in a protected environment.185
Moreover, should the Court retract its standing expansion and embrace of
PIL, citizens seeking to enforce forest policy and their fundamental rights
under the Constitution would have a meager basket of remedies. As shown
above in the review of common law remedies, nuisance and its companions
do not effectively address all the harms that occur to the environment and the
public. The injury requirement inherent in those actions precludes the vast
majority of the populace from participating in litigation and thus requires that
182
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actions be brought by a narrow subset of the population. Often those
excluded because of the injury requirement are those in a position to bring
suit, while those who sustain injury often are not.
In addition to maintaining its current standing requirements, the Court
should also continue with its promotion and treatment of PIL. Through that
vehicle, the Court manages to wield an immense amount of control over both
executive and parliamentary action. Though potentially harmful to notions
of separation of powers and rule by democratically elected branches of
government, the Court’s oversight is not currently tainted by judges’
individual motivations. The Court’s idealism regarding the proper role of
government and the enforcement of law guides its oversight and leads to a
pursuit of justice.
Moreover, the benefits of PIL, at least in the current state of governance
in India, outweigh the detriments. PIL allows redress of grievances that
would otherwise go without remedy. With agencies often unwilling or
unable to enforce environmental law and policy, there must be some
alternative that allows protection of public interests. PIL fulfills this role,
coupled with citizen standing, by allowing anyone to bring actions for
redress of public harms. Without PIL, deforestation in India would likely
increase because there would be substantially less enforcement of the forest’s
legal protections.
The occasional nuisance claim by one injured party does not carry the
severity or constancy required for nuisance to act as an adequate deterrent to
deforestation. Businesses would have fewer incentives not to exploit the
forests if PIL standing did not exist. The threat of judicial oversight and
agency regulation of business projects provides greater incentive to abide by
forest protection requirements than does a suit brought by one person with an
individual injury.
B. Administrative Agencies Moving Forward
Indian agencies often have idealistic mission statements and glass-halffull views of their own accomplishments.186 They have a history of inaction
in the face of citizen concerns and even in the face of legislative and judicial
mandates to act.187 Agency inaction was compounded by the recent
economic downturn, which impacted government revenues and caused
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expenditures on deforestation programs to decline.188 Any recommendations
for future action must be made in light of agency inertia and inadequate
enforcement resources.
One possible approach moving forward is to reorganize the Indian
environmental bureaucracy by placing MOEF under the direct supervision of
the Supreme Court. Arguably, placing the agency under closer supervision
would incentivize it to act in the face of citizen petitions and blatant
violations of law. However, the Court already exercises oversight over
virtually all administrative tribunals either directly, by establishing criteria
for selecting tribunal members,189 or indirectly, by preventing tribunalcreated legislation from exempting tribunals from the Court’s jurisdiction.190
A solution addressing fundamental questions about organization is
necessary to change the deep-seated tendency not to act by MOEF and other
agencies. First, parliament should pass regulatory legislation that creates a
system-wide sense of accountability for agency inaction. Establishing an
ombudsman to oversee administrative agencies would be a good first step.
Considering the Court’s successful (as compared with the executive branch)
oversight of MOEF and other agencies, the Court should be the venue for
any ombudsman’s reports. The Court has the power to act on such reports
and, through its activist approach, has demonstrated its ability to hold
agencies accountable. As perhaps the only institution in India with a
demonstrated history of prioritizing community values, the Court is uniquely
positioned to resist the tug of corrupting influences.
Those tribunals or agencies that fail to act in the face of evidence that
environmental laws are being violated should face repercussions. These
repercussions, however, should not negatively impact efforts at afforestation
and environmental protection. Budgets should not be cut in response to
agency inaction. Rather, agencies should operate more like private
enterprises, with pay and job security tied to performance. Agency jobs
should not be viewed as assignments with guaranteed pay and little work, but
they must pay enough to discourage wage-related turnover. These jobs
should be structured to incentivize people to work hard. Benefits and pay
should flow to those who are not corrupt and who enforce the Court’s orders
and statutory mandates. Those who do not perform or are involved in any
corruption should be terminated.
The consequences of inaction should be certain, swift, and proportional
for infractions by omission. No sanction is worth enacting if it is not applied
in every instance possible and with haste. Deterrence will not flow if agency
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employees do not view possible consequences as a probable reality for
inaction. Moreover, consequences must be proportional to the offense. In
other words, if a consequence is not strict enough, there will be no incentive
to discontinue the inaction, but if a consequence is too strict, the job will
hold very little appeal and drive valuable people away from protecting the
forests.
There should also be accountability for those tasked with exercising
agency authority. That is, the individuals within agencies should face some
measure of punishment for inaction in their sphere of responsibility. One
possible model of accountability for agency employees would be the
command responsibility standard featured in the Statute of the International
Criminal Court, Article 28.191 Under this model, those in positions of
authority would be held accountable for the inaction of their inferiors if they
knew or should have known that improper inaction took place.
This system of individual accountability at the agency level has the
benefit of imposing sanctions on the parties most likely to benefit from
inaction. Authority figures, not low-level employees, control the agenda in
any hierarchical organization and targeting them is more cost-effective and
efficient at reducing infractions than attempting to punish all employees who,
through inaction, act inappropriately.
Second, environmental protection and MOEF must garner a larger portion
of resources than they currently do. At some level, an agency’s ability to
take effective action is simply a matter of prioritizing national problems. As
long as the national government decides that forest protection should take a
backseat to other issues, there will always be a disconnect between what the
agencies can do and what the law and Court require of them. That is not to
say that more money is a panacea for deforestation. What more resources
will bring, however, is greater incentive for agency employees to act on an
individual level. If employees feel they have the resources to do their jobs
effectively and if they receive competitive wages, they are that much more
likely to act accordingly.
Moreover, greater resources enable agencies to engage in more
enforcement and remediation actions. However, more ability does not
necessarily translate into more action. Therefore, careful monitoring of
agencies and their resource expenditures would be necessary to ensure that
any additional resources were fruitfully employed.
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VI. CONCLUSION
India’s forests contain not only a vast array of species, but also a vast
array of resources. The forests contain minerals, timber, and perhaps most
importantly, land. As the population of India continues to grow, the
pressures to extract those resources by removing the forests will increase
correspondingly. Without protection and sustainable management, the
forests will fall victim to the rising tide of human demands on its contents.
India possesses many legal mechanisms with which it can protect forests.
Owing to its common law heritage, causes of action such as nuisance,
trespass, and strict liability exist to protect primarily private interests in the
environment. India also has several environmental statutes that protect broad
swaths of the environment. The Indian Forest Act of 1927 and the Forest
(Conservation) Act of 1980 work together to establish a framework for forest
management.
India’s most unique protection for the environment and forests is the
Indian Constitution.
It contains environmental policy guidance for
parliament,192 as well as a guarantee of life that the Indian Supreme Court
interprets as providing a right to a protected environment.193 Unlike other
common law jurisdictions, India’s most basic legal instrument is used to
directly addresses the question of forest protection.
The activist jurisprudence of the Indian Supreme Court overlays all three
sources of forest protection. Over the last several decades, the Court
eliminated the vast majority of standing requirements, most of which
demanded personal injury and formal pleading requirements. Now people
from any walk of life, with any amount of money, can petition the Court to
remedy harm to the public interest, including the public’s interest in forests.
The rise of PIL involves the Court in a much broader spectrum of cases and
broader oversight of the national and local governments.
Nevertheless, the positive effect judicial oversight has on the forests is
insufficient in the face of the certainty of population growth. Some data
even suggests that Indian forest cover actually shrank over the last twenty
years as the Court adopted a more activist approach.194 Since populations are
guaranteed to rise and current protections may be inadequate at current
population levels, a modified approach is necessary.
The Supreme Court’s activism likely stemmed from a tide of
deforestation caused by demands from the present population, but it has not
achieved greater forest protection in the recent past. However, the Court is
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not omnipotent and relies on the executive agencies, like MOEF, for
enforcement. What India needs now is for the Court to maintain its activist
approach to protection of the public interest. At the same time, it must also
reform its administrative agencies by encouraging greater accountability for
agency inaction at both the agency and individual levels. If the Court can
continue its role as the good governance organ of the national government,
and if administrative agency inaction decreases, the forests of India and those
whose lives depend on them stand more than a fighting chance of seeing the
end of this century in as good a shape as they saw the beginning.

